Technical Disclosure Commons
Defensive Publications Series

March 23, 2015

THIRD PARTY FUNCTIONING
SANDBOXING
Chris Sharp
Robert Shield

Follow this and additional works at: http://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series
Recommended Citation
Sharp, Chris and Shield, Robert, "THIRD PARTY FUNCTIONING SANDBOXING", Technical Disclosure Commons, (March 23,
2015)
http://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/43

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Technical Disclosure Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Defensive Publications
Series by an authorized administrator of Technical Disclosure Commons.

Sharp and Shield: THIRD PARTY FUNCTIONING SANDBOXING

THIRD PARTY FUNCTIONING SANDBOXING
ABSTRACT
The subject technology dynamically patches functions exported and/or used by third
party code to catch exceptions generated by third party code, to prevent the third party code from
crashing other processes in a system. All exceptions that the third party code generates (e.g.,
either directly or indirectly) are handled before being propagated up to the system level, and
before the system kills the process due to an unhanded exception.
PROBLEM
Third party code may be injected into virtual memory, and interact with the operating
system and its executing applications. Sometimes this code is not well written and may cause
crashes. If the code is unstable, and/or not useful for a user (like malware or adware), it may be
desirable to prevent the code from being loaded in the first place. Previous solutions include
blacklisting known malicious programs from being loaded by the system, and sandboxing
programs to prevent exceptions thrown by the programs to affect other programs executed by the
system. However, there is an abundance of third party code that users routinely download and
execute (e.g., Silverlight which allows them to watch Netflix), and determining which code may
cause problems is not practical. Additionally, blocking all unknown code (e.g., to increase
stability) may create an unhappy user base. Thus, solutions are required to allow unknown code
to execute without crashing the system.
DYNAMICALLY WRAPPING SYSTEM FUNCTIONS
When a process first begins, the executable file corresponding to the process is mapped
into a virtual address space allocated for the process. The virtual address space may include
multiple different components. For example, additional libraries may be mapped into the
address space in order for the process to be able to call functions provided by them.
The nature of operating systems require processes to use certain system-level functions
provided by the operating system to perform memory operations, such as loading libraries and/or
allocated objects into its virtual address space. In this regard, before a process may write to the
virtual address space the memory must be set to a write state, and before code in the memory
space can be executed it must be set to an executable state. For example, the process may call a
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system function (e.g., VirtualProtect) to change a protection level assigned to a region of the
virtual address space of the calling process.
Because most operating systems allow processes to perform dynamic patching, all places
that might be called into, for example, a third party dynamically-linked library (DLL) may be
unknown. The list of functions exported by the library, however, provide (in most cases) a
fairly good coverage of where exceptions could be raised from the third party code. The subject
technology includes system-level code that dynamically enumerates and patches exported
functions of code loaded into the virtual address space of an executing process. Patching may
occur when the program embodying the process is first loaded into memory. For example,
system functions responsible for loading the process into memory may include code for
determining whether the process is one that would require patching, and patching the libraries
used by the process (e.g., libraries that include system functions loaded into the virtual address
space). When those functions are called to load the process, the patching is initiated. The
patching may be effectuated by way of virtual wrappers which intercept calls to functions
exported by in-memory objects.
Copies of system-level functions are typically provided by dynamic linked libraries of the
kernel. When they are loaded into the virtual address space of the executing process, they are
modified by the subject technology with custom wrappers. (See Fig. 1.) When the process later
calls the system functions, the calls must go through the wrappers. In this manner, each call may
be inspected by the operating system and a decision made as to whether the call should be
allowed to complete as expected, or whether the call should be modified or blocked. In some
implementations, the wrappers are configured to render the call ineffective while simply
returning an expected response to the calling process. For example, the calling process may call
a system-level function to modify or otherwise patch a portion of code in its virtual address
space. The wrapper intercepts the call, prevents the code modification, and reports the
modification as being successful to the calling process.
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Fig. 1
In some implementations, the subject technology patches a DLL on detecting the loading
of the DLL. When the process that loaded the DLL attempts to call functions of the DLL the
function calls are intercepted by the wrapper and rendered useless. Accordingly, if the DLL was
loaded with malicious intent, for example, to alter the normal operation of the system, the DLL is
rendered inoperable and normal operation of the system is maintained. In some aspects, the
subject technology requires little knowledge of what third party DLLs are loaded, since it merely
examines the public (and local) functions of a library or process and exports and wraps them. In
this manner, exceptions are prevented from propagating up to a point where the system is
compromised. A potential alternative way to prevent third party crashes may include converting
all exported functions into null operations. In this case, the third party code wouldn't generate
exceptions, but the user may lose the functionality that the third party code was offering.
Using the subject technology, software is allowed to inject modules, including unknown
code, into a system. However, when unwanted code is injected into the system, the unwanted
code is rendered useless and stability of the system is maintained. Meanwhile, the process that
injected the unwanted code operates as it normally does. In this regards, the subject technology
allows third party code to run within a program, but greatly decreases the risk of code crashing
the program. Accordingly, users are able to install whatever third party code they want, and the
rate of crashes resulting from unstable or malicious code is decreased.
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